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Abstract—Detecting the occurrence and location of perfor-
mance anomalies (e.g., high jitter or loss events) is critical to
ensuring the effective operation of network infrastructures. In
this paper we present a framework for detecting and localizing
performance anomalies based on using an active probe-enabled
measurement infrastructure deployed on the periphery of a
network. Our framework has three components: an algorithm
for detecting performance anomalies on a path, an algorithm for
selecting which paths to probe at a given time in order to detect
performance anomalies (where a path is deﬁned as the set of
links between two measurement nodes), and an algorithm for
identifying the links that are causing an identiﬁed anomaly on
ap a t h( i.e., localizing). The problem of detecting an anomaly
on a path is addressed by comparing probe-based measures
of performance characteristics with performance guarantees
for the network (e.g., SLAs). The path selection algorithm is
designed to enable a tradeoff between ensuring that all links
in a network are frequently monitored to detect performance
anomalies, while minimizing probing overhead. The localization
algorithm is designed to use existing path measurement data in
such a way as to minimize the number of paths necessary for
additional probing in order to identify the link(s) responsible for
an observed performance anomaly. We assess the feasibility of
our framework and algorithms by implementing them in ns-2 and
conducting a set of simulation-based experiments using several
different network topologies. Our results show that our method
is able to accurately detect and localize performance anomalies
in a timely fashion and with lower probe and computational
overheads than previously proposed methodologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary responsibilities of network operators is
to ensure that their infrastructures provide a level of perfor-
mance and robustness that satisﬁes the commitments speciﬁed
in their service level agreements (SLAs) with customers.
A standard approach for addressing this responsibility is to
monitor the behavior of the infrastructure and identify unusual
or anomalous activity that either directly indicates or indirectly
implies that the network is no longer behaving satisfacto-
rily. Monitoring and detecting meaningful events in huge
infrastructures with high bandwidth links where normal trafﬁc
behavior can be highly dynamic presents serious challenges.
Prior work on detecting network anomalies has focused
primarily on techniques for distinguishing signiﬁcant devi-
ations from normal (e.g., [1], [2]) or on speciﬁc aspects
of unwanted behavior such as malicious attacks (e.g.,[ 3 ] ,
[4]). These studies have been based almost exclusively on
passive measurements, which cannot be used for monitoring
key metrics in SLAs including delay or jitter.
In this paper we present a framework for monitoring, detect-
ing and localizing performance anomalies in a network. Our
framework assumes that a set of active measurement systems is
deployed around the edges of the network (e.g., implemented
directly in routers as in [5]) and that probes sent between
these systems can cover all links of interest in the network.
The ﬁrst component of our framework is an algorithm for
detecting performance anomalies on an individual path, where
a path is deﬁned as the set of links between two measurement
nodes. Our algorithm uses active probing in conjunction with
performance thresholds speciﬁed in SLAs. When a threshold
is exceeded (i.e., an anomaly is detected), an alarm is raised.
The second component of our framework is a path selection
algorithm for performance anomaly detection that determines
which path(s) should be probed at a given point in time. The
objectives of this algorithm are to ensure that all links in
the network are frequently probed in order to quickly detect
anomalies, while limiting probing overhead. Our algorithm is
iterative and associates weights with links such that the weight
wi associated with a link i increases over time if it is not on
a path chosen for probing during a given time interval. This
increase in weight results in an increased probability that a
path containing that link will be probed in the near future.
Whereas previous approaches, e.g. [6], [7], have employed
techniques that ensure full coverage of all network links at
each probing interval in order to immediately detect problems,
this may come at an unacceptable cost of high probing
overhead on network links used by multiple probing paths. A
key goal of our methodology is to enable a tradeoff between
the volume of probe trafﬁc and the frequency of probing on
individual links, and by extension the timeliness of detection.
The third component of our framework is a localization
algorithm that enables efﬁcient identiﬁcation of the link that
is responsible for the anomalous behavior. This algorithm
is triggered when an anomaly is detected on a path. Our
approach is to iteratively select additional paths to probe that
will maximally increase information regarding the location of
an anomaly. We show that conditioning the selection of a new
path to probe such that it overlaps half of the current set of
links with uncertain state optimally increases, on average, the
information about the location of an observed anomaly.2
We demonstrate and evaluate our framework by imple-
menting our algorithms in ns-2. We use a set of synthetic
topologies plus a set of topologies derived from traceroute
measurements from the Rocketfuel [8] project as the ba-
sis for our experiments. We generate random performance
anomalies in our experiments and assess the capability of
our algorithms to detect and identify the offending links. Our
results show that our algorithms are able to detect and localize
the anomalies accurately, efﬁciently and in a timely fashion.
We also show that while other path selection algorithms
can introduce signiﬁcant probing overhead on network links,
our algorithm enables quick performance anomaly detection
while limiting probing overhead. We believe that our results
highlight the promise of our framework and its potential utility
in operational deployments.
II. RELATED WORK
Detecting and localizing network performance anomalies
is an important problem for operational networks and has
received substantial attention in prior work. Past efforts have
largely focused on using passively collected data to detect,
and possibly locate, performance anomalies; see, e.g., [9]. For
example, Huang et al. considered the problem of detecting
general performance problems in a network using only passive
packet measurements [10].
Bejerano and Ragosti describe a methodology for actively
monitoring all the links of a network in an efﬁcient way [6].
They show that the problem of selecting a minimal set of
paths such that all links of a network are monitored is an
instance of the well-known NP-hard minimal set covering
problem, for which they provide a greedy heuristic solution.
This work (and other, similar work, e.g., [7]) assumes that
per-path probing overhead is negligible, so that links that are
probed by more than one path as part of the set covering
do not suffer high probing overhead. However, many probing
algorithms can produce 10s to 100s of kb/s of trafﬁc or more
per path, making this assumption problematic in operational
networks. Our approach for selecting network paths differs
from prior work in that we allow a tradeoff to be made between
detection timeliness and potential overhead on network links.
Dhamdhere et al. considered the detection and localization
of reachability faults in [7] based on the insights of [6] as
well as work by Dufﬁeld [11]. In the latter work, Dufﬁeld
describes a tomographic method for inferring the location of
problematic links when considering binary network perfor-
mance characteristics (i.e., either a link exhibits a problem or
it does not). Dhamdhere et al. extend the work of Dufﬁeld to
an interdomain setting and attempt to improve the localization
technique by leveraging additional network measurements. A
number of other fault localization methods may be found in,
e.g., [12]–[17]. In general, these prior methods employ models
(e.g., prior fault probabilities in a Bayesian framework [15])
or external (not probe-based) measurement data (e.g., route
advertisements [7]) in order to better hypothesize the location
of an observed fault. Our work differs from these prior
methodologies in that we develop an algorithm for selecting
additional paths for probing in order to empirically localize a
performance anomaly that has been detected.
A great deal of prior work has focused on developing
active probe-based methods for measuring performance char-
acteristics of individual end-to-end paths. A repository of
a number of popular tools for end-to-end measurement can
be found in [18]. We use SLAm [19] in this study since
it enables performance characteristics associated with SLAs
to be measured accurately with a single probe stream. Our
framework does not require the use of SLAm and could be
used with other tools, if desired.
III. FRAMEWORK TERMINOLOGY AND APPROACH
We consider the network under study as a directed multi-
graph G =( V,E). We consider a directed network because
we may want to label the edge with values (e.g., failure status,
congestion) that depend on the direction of trafﬁc ﬂow. We
consider a multigraph because we may want to distinguish
multiple links between two nodes (e.g., composite links in
which an IP layer link is realized by operating several physical
links in parallel). Along with G comes a set of routes R,
which for each ordered pair (u,v) ⊂ V speciﬁes a subset
R(u,v) ⊂ R of paths that join from u to v. We assume there
is at least one route r(u,v) from each u to each v.W ea l s o
assume that the set R does not change during detection and
localization. In § VII we discuss the issue of routing changes.
Furthermore, we assume for simplicity that there is only one
route from any node u to v.
A subset W ⊂ V of nodes will be the measurement
nodes. Each measurement node can act as a source or sink
of probes, although it need not perform both functions. In
this paper we assume that each measurement node is a leaf
node in the network. That is, there is only one edge incident
on a measurement node. We assume there is some subset
F ⊂ E of edges under study, in the sense that when a problem
affecting packet transmission occurs on a link in F,w ew i s h
to become aware that an anomaly exists and determine its
location. Finally, we assume for simplicity that performance
anomalies are persistent.
The general approach of our framework is to proceed in two
phases. During the ﬁrst phase, we probe the network using
the paths between the measurement nodes in W to detect
performance anomalies. In this paper, we assume an intra-
domain network setting in which the routes between the nodes
in W are known, and in particular that the links traversed
(covered) by those paths are known. During the detection
phase, the main goal is to quickly detect anomalies on any
link(s) residing on all paths between nodes in W. That is, our
probing paths must cover (over some time period) all links in
F. A key constraint is that of probing bandwidth. For example,
it may not be possible to simultaneously probe all O(N2) paths
between the W measurement points at a rate fast enough to
detect events at all (small) timescales of interest. Furthermore,
given a modest per-link probing bandwidth constraint, it may
not even be possible to probe over a reduced set of paths that3
cover all the links of the network since there may be multiple
probe streams crossing a single link.
Once an anomaly has been detected, we initiate a localiza-
tion phase in an attempt to identify the link(s) responsible for
the observed anomaly. In contrast to prior work, we assume
that all localization is done through active probing. Thus, the
goal is to, as quickly as possible, determine the link(s) on
which the performance anomaly is located while limiting the
bandwidth used for additional probing.
Finally, we assume that for both the detection and localiza-
tion phases time proceeds through a series of intervals, the
length t of which is matched to the probing methodology
employed. For example, t might be set such that a reasonable
bound on measurement accuracy can be obtained.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANOMALY DETECTION
In active probing of a network to detect performance
anomalies there is an inherent tension between attempting
to maximize coverage over network links on the one hand,
and minimizing the load due to probing on the other. In
considering how to balance these desiderata, we ﬁrst consider
three strategic extremes.
A. Detection Strategies
1) Complete Path Coverage: The simplest, yet most intru-
sive strategy is to choose all measurement nodes in W and
probe over this O(N2) set of paths. Depending on topology,
this approach may result in excessive probing of some links.
2) Minimal Edge Coverage: A less intrusive strategy is to
ﬁnd a minimal set N of measurement nodes such that there
is a set R  of paths r(u,v) between nodes u,v in N with the
property that each edge in F lies on at least one such path.
The idea here is that an anomaly on any link in F will be
evident in at least one measurement between nodes in N.
One approach to ﬁnding this set of paths is, following the
approach of [6], to compute a minimal set covering. The
standard greedy approximation is well known to be within
a log-factor of the optimal [20]. For example, in Figure 1a,
a greedy set covering approach might result in the fol-
lowing paths: (A,E,G,H,D),(B,F,H,G,C),(A,E,F,B)
(plus the reverse paths). Note however, that the links
(A,E),(B,F),(G,H) are covered by two paths. Depending
on the probing methodology and operational constraints, this
load may not be acceptable. Furthermore, for large networks
the set covering computational overhead can be quite costly.
3) Complete Edge Coverage: A different strategy is to ﬁnd
the minimal set N of measurement nodes such that there
is a set R  of paths r(u,v) between nodes u,v in N such
that if there is an anomaly on any edge or set of edges in
F the identity of the anomalous link(s) can be determined
from measurements on R . Here we think of examples when
the problem on a link is a 0-1 variable (lack of connectivity,
performance measure exceeds threshold), and can be inferred
by standard performance tomography methods.
Clearly, minimal edge coverage is necessary in order to
detect anomalies on any edge. However, complete edge cov-
erage can be viewed as wasteful in the sense that for a given
problematic edge, some of the measurements may be not be
needed to locate the link exhibiting an anomaly.
B. Detection Tactics
We now present a novel algorithm for determining which
paths to probe during the detection phase. In principle, knowl-
edge of the routing and topology could be used to ﬁnd the
exact minimal set of paths. However, topology may change
(rarely) and so may routing (often). Hence some mechanism
is needed to dynamically adapt the set of measurement paths
to underlying changes in the network. One approach may be
to precompute the routing changes due to a set of possible
link failures (i.e., compute minimum set coverings for several
routing scenarios), and to employ a larger set of measurement
paths in order to provide illumination of edges that would no
longer be covered by measurements under rerouting under just
minimal edge coverage. However, this may be computationally
infeasible, particularly in large networks. This problem may
even apply for minimal edge coverage even without the
requirement of robustness under rerouting.
An opposite approach to heavyweight optimization is to
adopt a computationally simple algorithm that nevertheless
generates a set of covering paths that is not much larger than
the optimal set. It is this approach that we take.
To each link i ∈ F, we assign a static importance weight
Wi. As our algorithm proceeds, a dynamic current link weight
wi is calculated. Each path r in the network is weighted
according to the sum of the current weights of the links that
comprise it. Initially, the current link weights are set to 0.
We start by sorting all possible paths according to their
weight, and probe on k paths selected randomly from the K
paths with the largest weights. For example, if k =1and the
largest weight of all paths is ¯ W, we choose one path randomly
from all paths K that have weight ¯ W. Once a path (or set of
paths) is chosen, we send probes along each of those paths in
an effort to detect performance anomalies.
Once probing during the current time interval has com-
pleted, we set to 0 the current weights on all links of paths
that were checked. For links that were not probed, the current
weight wi is updated as wi = min(Wi,w i+ Wi
(N−1)/k), where
N is the total number of paths in the network that can be
probed. Thus, the current weight wi of a link varies between
0 and the importance (maximum) weight for that link Wi.
The heuristic here is that by visiting a certain link during an
experiment, we reduce the weight of all paths that utilize that
link. However, the weight of those paths rises as time proceeds.
Note that the importance weight Wi of a given link may be set
based, e.g., on knowledge of important trafﬁc ﬂows, in order to
induce more or less frequent probing on the link. For simplicity
in our experiments we set these importance weights to 1. Note
also that since at each time interval we greedily choose the k
highest weighted paths for probing, our algorithm is effectively
a greedy solution to the minimum set covering problem. The
key difference is that the computations are divided over a series
of time intervals, thus reducing overhead at each interval. In
§ VI we quantify this reduction.4
Note that this algorithm does not by itself guarantee that,
during a given probing interval, links are covered at most once.
In particular, with k>1, it is indeed possible for links to be
probed by multiple measurement nodes simultaneously during
a given probing interval. An important variant of the above
path selection methodology that we consider in our evaluation
is to select k paths with the highest weights in a given time
interval that do not have any (unidirectional) links in common.
C. Detecting Anomalies on an End-to-end Path
Network anomaly detection is based on the idea of identi-
fying signiﬁcant deviations from the normal state. Thus, our
challenge is to develop a method for establishing a normal
state of an end-to-end path with active probes, and then
to detect when the conditions on that path are sufﬁciently
different from normal to raise an alarm.
Once a path has been selected, a series of probe packets is
sent along the path (according to some probing methodology),
over a given time interval. The result of probing a single
path is a set of one-way measurements. Our goal is to label
the links of a path as being in an anomalous state (e.g.,
“condition red”), nearly in an anomalous state (e.g., “condition
yellow”), or functioning normally (e.g., “condition green”).
Similar to Nguyen and Thiran [15], our approach is to require
a user to specify thresholds for what is anomalous (maximum
values for delay/jitter/loss) and nearly anomalous (relative to
maximum) for measurement on a given path. This provides an
implicit deﬁnition of normal for each path characteristic and
has important implications for deployment such as obviating
the need to apply complex signal analysis to measurements.
V. PERFORMANCE ANOMALY LOCALIZATION
Once a performance anomaly has been detected on a
path during the detection phase, the localization phase is
initiated in order to ﬁnd the link(s) responsible for the
observed anomaly. To illustrate the problem, we consider
again the topology in Figure 1a. Even in such a simple
topology, a set of paths that covers all links during the
detection phase may not enable immediate localization of
an observed anomaly. For example, given probing along
the paths (A,E,G,H,D),(B,F,H,G,C),(A,E,F,B) (plus
the reverse paths) and an anomaly observed only on path
(A,E,G,H,D), we can immediately eliminate the links
(A,E),(G,H) since they lie on anomaly-free paths. However,
we cannot narrow the location of the anomaly any further than
{(E,G),(H,D)} without additional probing or information.
A. Localization Strategy
Given that a performance anomaly has been detected, the
minimal edge coverage and complete edge coverage strategies
described above lead naturally to a strategy that we call
conditional complete edge coverage. Here we condition on an
anomaly having been detected on some maximal subset R   of
measurement paths (maximal in that it contains all potentially
problematic paths). We may then attempt to ﬁnd the minimal
set of nodes N  such that there is a set of paths Q between
nodes in N  for which measurements on Q sufﬁce to locate
the problematic link(s) within R  .
Measurement can then be done on one of the set of paths
in Q. The result of this probing can be used to condition
a subsequent set of possible measurements. Each additional
measurement gives rise to a new version of the condition-
ing problem. Note that this occurs whether or not the path
measurement ﬁnds an anomaly; an outcome of no problem
observed on a newly measured path may provide sufﬁcient
information to locate the remaining anomalous links.
B. Path Selection during Localization
How should paths be selected from the set Q for localizing
a performance anomaly? In a general sense, given the current
state of knowledge of the network (e.g., some set of paths
exhibits an anomaly) the next measurement path should be
chosen in order to maximize the mutual information between
the current and new knowledge. Finding a global maximum
across a network may be difﬁcult in practice; here we con-
centrate on a single path. Suppose a single path exhibits an
anomaly. We aim to select an intersecting path in order to
maximize the mutual information. In this paper we consider a
simple state-counting approach to locating a single anomalous
link on a path. We have also considered a more complex
analysis of this problem that also allows for an anomaly on
a new path chosen for measurement during the localization
process. We intend to report on the latter analysis in the
future. Our analysis in both cases shows that we should choose
the second path to partially intersect the ﬁrst path. When
anomalies are rare, half the ﬁrst path should be overlapped
by the second. A key to analysis is ﬁrst conditioning on the
existence of an anomaly on the ﬁrst path.
1) Path Selection Analysis: State Counting on a Single
Path: Consider a path of n links which we label 1,2,...,n.
Suppose that end-to-end measurement along the path has
indicated an anomaly on the path. For simplicity we assume
that only one link is problematic. This is reasonable when the
probability of any link anomaly is very small. If we assume
links are independently problematic, then conditioned on at
least one link being problematic, it is overwhelmingly likely
that only one link is problematic. We also assume each link
has an equal chance to exhibit an anomaly.
We consider a state of the path to specify for each link
whether it is problematic or not. Conditioned on the path
being problematic, in the above model there are n possible
states (one for each link to be problematic). The number of
possible states represents our uncertainty in the location of the
anomaly. The aim of localization measurement is to minimize
this uncertainty.
Now suppose we supplement the initial measurement that
revealed a performance anomaly with a second measurement
from the source along the subpath (1,2,...,m) for m<n .
How should we best choose m? The idea is to choose m in
order to minimize the number of possible states compatible
with the information received in the second measurement.
Here we do this is an average sense: we minimize the average5
number of possible states after the second measurement. We
assume that the anomaly is persistent: the second measurement
is subject to the same observed link problems as the ﬁrst.
Suppose the original problem lies along subpath
(1,2,...,m). This happens with probability p− = m/n
since links are equally likely to exhibit an anomaly.
Assuming the anomaly lies on one of the ﬁrst m links, there
are N− = m possible states remaining. In the alternative
case, the anomaly was in the subpath (m +1 ,...,n), with
probability p+ =( n−m)/n, corresponding to N+ =( n−m)
states. Hence the average number of possible states after the
second measurement is p−N− + p+N+ =
m
2+(n−m)
2
n which
is minimized when m = n/2. Thus the second measurement
should encompass half the problematic path.
C. Localization Tactics
We now describe the algorithm used during the localization
phase. Suppose that during the most recent detection phase
interval we probe the paths ri,i∈ 1..k. Call this set of paths
D. Assume we observe a performance anomaly on at least
one path; call this set of paths D  ⊆ D. Initially, the set
of paths in D  constitutes the current hypothesized location
of the anomaly. We denote the hypothesized location of the
anomaly as H. Note that as we narrow the location of the
observed anomaly, links will be removed from H.T h u s ,w e
more generally consider H to be a set of partial paths, or path
segments.N o w ,i fk>1, we may be able to immediately
narrow the location of an observed anomaly. First, if we
assume there is a single anomaly, we can reduce H to the
set of path segments common to all paths in H. Next, we can
remove links on which we did not observe an anomaly (i.e.,
links on paths in D − D ) from path segments in H.
At this point, we employ the path selection analysis from
above to select a set of paths for additional probing in order
to further reduce H. That is, a path to probe for localization is
chosen such that the overlap between the new path and a path
segment hi ∈ H is as close as possible to half the length of
hi. Furthermore, if H consists of more than one path segment,
we may probe more than one path during a given interval in
the localization phase as long as the paths do not overlap.
Depending on the result of probing along the new path(s),
the set of path segments in H will decrease. If H has been
reduced to one segment consisting of a single link, the lo-
calization algorithm terminates. Otherwise, a new overlapping
path is chosen such that it has not yet been probed during
the localization phase. If all paths that overlap path segments
in H have been probed, the localization algorithm terminates
and reports H as the best possible estimate of the anomaly
location. Note that depending on probe monitor placement and
network topology, it may not be possible to localize a given
anomaly to a single link.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Experiment Setup
We constructed simulation experiments using ns-2 [21] in
order to evaluate the detection and localization algorithms
described above. We modiﬁed ns-2 to implement the SLAm
probing methodology described in Sommers et. al [19]. Cur-
rently, the SLAm implementation in ns-2 only includes the
per-path probing methodologies described in [19] and does
not yet include any distributional inference capabilities.
The focus of our experiments was to evaluate the path
selection algorithms for the detection and localization phases
as described above in a variety of increasingly complex
topological settings. We explicitly do not focus on the accuracy
characteristics of SLAm or indeed any particular one-way
probing methodology. For this reason, we did not experiment
with a variety of link bandwidths or propagation delays. The
link bandwidths in each topology are 100 Mb/s with one-way
delays of 10 milliseconds. In addition, rather than creating
network performance anomalies endogenously using a range of
background trafﬁc conditions, we explicitly introduced them,
i.e., through the introduction of an ns-2 ErrorModel element
for temporarily inducing packet loss or through temporary
increase of the one-way link delay. All errors are injected
in one direction for a given link. For simplicity, we use a
network-wide loss rate threshold for detecting a performance
anomaly, set at 0.5%, and focus solely on loss rate anomaly
detection and localization. Finally, we note that in our current
study we assume a centralized controller that chooses paths for
probing. In future work we intend to investigate architectures
for distributed coordination among measurement nodes.
We focus on a variety of topological settings for our
experiments. We used 15 topologies: 5 synthetic HOT-like
topologies created using the Orbis topology generator [22],
and 10 topologies derived from the Rocketfuel project [8].
Four of these topologies are shown in Figure 1, and summary
statistics for all topologies considered in our evaluation are
given in Table I. For each topology, we consider all leaf nodes
to have SLAm measurement capability (both sending and
receiving probes). Among these measurement nodes, all paths
are considered as candidates on which to initiate measurement.
Furthermore, we assume that an anomaly can occur on any
link in a given topology and that we wish to detect anomalies
on all links of the network. To compute paths, we calculated
shortest paths (using number of hops for simplicity) between
all pairs of measurement nodes at the start of a simulation.
An individual simulation experiment proceeds with probing
in the detection regime. For this phase, k paths are probed
at a given time; paths with the highest sum of link weights
are chosen for probing, as described in § IV-B. After each
group of k paths has been probed, link weights are updated.
Each path is probed for t seconds. The value of t can be
chosen based on the probing methodology, and need not be a
ﬁxed value. For simplicity in our experiments, we chose t =
10. At random time ta, a persistent performance anomaly is
created (i.e., loss is induced by a packet dropping element) on a
given link, which should result in an observable performance
anomaly. For our simulations, we set the magnitude of the
performance anomaly to be a loss rate of 1%, which should
result in detection at some point in the future. In this paper
we assume that only one anomalous link occurs at a time, and6
assume that once a link has been corrupted, it persists in that
state. We discuss these limitations further in § VII.
Once the performance anomaly has been detected at time
td ≥ ta, the localization algorithm described in § V is invoked.
Once the anomaly has been localized to the degree possible,
the simulation terminates.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF TOPOLOGIES CONSIDERED IN EVALUATION.
Topology Interior Leaf Total Monitor Node
Nodes Nodes Nodes Path Length Degree
μ (σ) μ (σ)
Synthetic Topologies
HOT 1 5 16 21 2.458 (0.266) 2.381 (11.748)
HOT 2 8 31 39 2.888 (0.452) 2.205 (13.746)
HOT 3 17 49 66 3.806 (1.240) 2.333 (10.718)
HOT 4 93 246 339 4.562 (1.147) 2.690 (19.078)
HOT 5 181 502 683 4.752 (1.269) 2.630 (27.799)
Rocketfuel-derived Topologies
AS1299 17 14 31 3.692 (1.408) 2.839 (5.206)
AS3300 21 22 43 4.017 (1.206) 2.605 (6.435)
AS4323 40 11 51 4.400 (1.453) 6.314 (44.020)
AS1239 33 19 52 4.129 (1.004) 3.231 (7.750)
AS209 33 25 58 3.907 (0.806) 3.724 (13.572)
AS3549 51 10 61 3.467 (0.342) 15.934 (197.729)
AS3356 46 17 63 3.250 (0.262) 9.048 (104.562)
AS2914 47 23 70 4.403 (1.009) 3.171 (7.390)
AS701 48 35 83 3.235 (0.305) 5.277 (51.934)
AS7018 35 80 115 3.615 (0.753) 2.574 (16.352)
B. Results
In the results below, we use a series of 100 simulation
experiments started using different random seeds. We ﬁrst
discuss results related to the detection phase, followed by
results related to the localization phase.
We ﬁrst note that there were no false positives in perfor-
mance anomaly detection or localization (i.e., link(s) misiden-
tiﬁed as the location of an anomaly), and there were no false
negatives (i.e., failure to identify the link(s) responsible for an
anomaly). Given that our experiments were performed in sim-
ulation, this result should not be surprising. Nonetheless, this
result is in sharp contrast to prior work (including simulation
studies) in which both false positives and false negatives have
been reported. The key difference is that we employ probing
to localize anomalies whereas other approaches have used
additional information (e.g., routing updates, prior fault prob-
abilities, etc.) that may simply not lead to correct inference
of the location of the anomaly. While additional probing has
some cost associated with it, our results clearly demonstrate
the beneﬁts of this approach.
1) Detection: For the detection phase, we examine three
metrics: detection time, link load, and network coverage.W e
report detection time in terms of the number of probing inter-
vals. For link load, we report mean and standard deviation of
the number of probe streams incident on links that are probed
during each time interval. We also consider the distribution
of link load across the topology. Network coverage considers
the fraction of links in F that are probed during a given time
interval. For this metric, we report on the mean and standard
deviation of coverage over all detection time intervals.
We considered three basic variants of path selection for
the detection phase. In the ﬁrst, we choose k paths for each
interval, allowing these paths to possibly overlap (i.e., link load
may be greater than 1, coverage ≤ 1). In the second, we choose
k top-weighted paths that do not overlap (i.e., link load is at
most 1, coverage ≤ 1). In the third, we compute a minimum
set cover (i.e., link load may be greater than 1, coverage = 1).
For the ﬁrst two path selection variants, we used values of k
of 1,2,4,6,8,10 as well as the extreme k = |R|. For the case
in which we allow paths to overlap, this results in probing all
(O(N2)) paths in network (i.e., link load ≥ 1, coverage = 1).
For the case in which we do not allow paths to overlap during
a given detection probing interval, this results in choosing a
set of non-overlapping, maximally-weighted paths in R (i.e.,
link load at most 1, coverage ≤ 1). Below, we denote the
overlapping case as N2 and the non-overlapping case as kmax.
To begin, we show in Table II results for the two topologies
HOT-3 and Rocketfuel-derived AS7018. The table shows the
mean and standard deviation of detection time, link load, and
network coverage for a range of values of k. We show results
for the cases in which we allow paths probed during detection
to have overlapping links, and in which we disallow overlap.
For each topology, we see that increasing the number of paths
probed during a given probing interval decreases the detection
time. We observe that for the cases in which we cover all
links in each probing interval (i.e., k = N2 and the minimum
set cover), detection time is 0, meaning that the anomaly is
detected during the same interval in which it occurs. However,
we see that this rapid detection comes at a cost: for the N2
case, the mean probing overlap on the link is extremely high,
and for the minimum set covering case, the mean load is
greater than 1, i.e., on average, each link is covered by more
than one probe stream. For the case in which we choose
as many non-overlapping paths as possible (kmax) in each
probing interval, we see that while link load is (by deﬁnition)
at most 1, the detection time does not rise substantially. From
these results, we clearly observe the potential problem of
blindly choosing links that overlap. In the results below, we
focus on choosing non-overlapping paths during the detection
phase, as well as the minimum set covering path selection.
Figure 2 expands on these results by showing, for a set of
representative topologies, detection times for a range of values
of k. For this ﬁgure, we only consider non-overlapping paths.
As with Table II, we see a rapid decrease in detection time as
we increase the number of paths probed during each interval.
We also see that for the case kmax, detection time is often
close to zero.
Table III shows detection results for all topologies, for
the case of choosing as many high-weighted, non-overlapping
paths as possible (kmax) and for a minimum set covering. We
observe that although detection times for kmax are somewhat
topology dependent, in general the mean detection time is
much less than 1. Topology also affects link load when choos-
ing a minimum set covering for anomaly detection probing.
The table shows that, in general, average link load is less
than 2. We show, in Figure 3, the distribution of link load for7
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(b) HOT topology 2. (c) HOT topology 3. (d) Rocketfuel AS3300 topol-
ogy.
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Fig. 1. Selected topologies used for simulation experiments. For each topology, leaf (measurement-capable) nodes are dark and standard packet forwarding
elements are in light gray.
TABLE II
DETECTION PHASE RESULTS FOR THE HOT-3 AND ROCKETFUEL AS7018 TOPOLOGIES WITH A RANGE OF VALUES FOR k.
Topology k Detection Link Network Detection Link Network
Time Load Coverage Time Load Coverage
μ (σ) μ (σ) μ (σ) μ (σ) μ (σ) μ (σ)
Link overlap allowed No link overlap allowed
HOT-3 1 26.030 (4.285) 1.000 (0.000) 0.028 (0.033) 26.030 (4.285) 1.000 (0.000) 0.028 (0.035)
2 13.720 (3.343) 1.379 (0.225) 0.043 (0.040) 9.290 (2.840) 1.000 (0.000) 0.058 (0.022)
4 9.010 (2.647) 1.828 (0.268) 0.067 (0.049) 6.150 (2.066) 1.000 (0.000) 0.113 (0.017)
N2 / kmax 0.000 (0.000) 58.130 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.170 (0.671) 1.000 (0.000) 0.887 (0.030)
min set cover 0.000 (0.000) 1.338 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000)
AS7018 1 36.200 (4.090) 1.000 (0.000) 0.020 (0.026) 36.200 (4.909) 1.000 (0.000) 0.020 (0.026)
2 25.060 (4.113) 1.417 (0.193) 0.028 (0.026) 18.240 (3.703) 1.000 (0.000) 0.039 (0.017)
4 13.950 (3.266) 1.849 (0.253) 0.043 (0.037) 9.000 (2.643) 1.000 (0.000) 0.075 (0.014)
N2 / kmax 0.000 (0.000) 102.910 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.050 (0.468) 1.000 (0.000) 0.928 (0.053)
min set cover 0.000 (0.000) 1.396 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000)
minimum set coverings for all topologies in order to examine
this issue more carefully. We see that between 60–85% of links
only have 1 probe stream traversing them, but there are links
on which there are several probe streams. For nearly all of
the topologies we consider, the load on some links introduced
by using a greedy minimum set covering may be too large to
consider using this algorithm in practice.
HOT−1 HOT−2 HOT−3 AS209 AS3356 AS2914 AS7018
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Fig. 2. Representative results of performance anomaly detection time for
k =( 1 ,2,4,10,k max) paths simultaneously probed during the detection
phase. The no-overlap variant of the detection path selection algorithm is
used for these results. Bars indicate mean detection time and lines show one
standard deviation above and below the mean.
Finally, we examine processing overhead during the detec-
tion phase. Table IV shows the mean and standard deviation of
TABLE III
DETECTION PHASE RESULTS FOR ALL TOPOLOGIES FOR THE kmax AND
SET COVER PATH SELECTION ALGORITHMS.N OTE: FOR THE kmax CASE,
LINK LOAD IS ALWAYS 1; FOR THE MINIMUM SET COVER CASE,
DETECTION TIME IS ALWAYS 0 AND NETWORK COVERAGE IS ALWAYS 1.
Detection Network Link
Time Coverage Load
μ (σ) μ (σ) μ (σ)
Topology kmax (No overlap) Minimum set cover
HOT-1 0.320 (0.903) 0.762 (0.046) 1.320 (0.000)
HOT-2 0.250 (0.801) 0.841 (0.056) 1.395 (0.000)
HOT-3 0.170 (0.671) 0.887 (0.030) 1.338 (0.000)
HOT-4 0.120 (0.571) 0.909 (0.032) 1.377 (0.000)
HOT-5 0.060 (0.239) 0.924 (0.001) 1.409 (0.000)
AS1299 0.310 (0.784) 0.737 (0.052) 1.525 (0.000)
AS3300 0.220 (0.645) 0.818 (0.051) 1.185 (0.000)
AS4323 0.210 (0.675) 0.736 (0.058) 1.462 (0.000)
AS1239 0.520 (0.957) 0.664 (0.045) 1.529 (0.000)
AS209 0.480 (0.839) 0.710 (0.047) 1.451 (0.000)
AS3549 1.700 (1.378) 0.470 (0.032) 1.973 (0.000)
AS3356 3.210 (1.904) 0.360 (0.039) 2.267 (0.000)
AS2914 0.460 (0.863) 0.694 (0.047) 1.460 (0.000)
AS701 1.340 (1.348) 0.537 (0.024) 1.917 (0.000)
AS7018 0.050 (0.468) 0.928 (0.051) 1.396 (0.000)
processing time required to compute the set of paths to probe
during detection for the kmax (no-overlap) and minimum set
covering algorithms over 100 runs on a modern server. For this
experiment we compute the minimum set covering for each
interval, which is normally not required unless the routing8
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Fig. 3. CDF of link loads when using a minimum set covering during the
detection phase.
topology has changed. Thus, this computational cost can be
amortized over a series of probing intervals. Nevertheless, we
see from the table that the cost of computing the minimum
set covering is extremely high compared with calculating a
maximal subset of high-weighted, non-overlapping paths. In
particular, the cost of the minimum set covering is about a
factor of 40 greater for the rather small HOT-2 topology; this
disparity grows dramatically with topology size.
TABLE IV
PROCESSING TIME COMPARISON FOR kmax AND MINIMUM SET COVERING
PATH SELECTION.T ABLE ENTRIES SHOW MEAN AND STANDARD
DEVIATION OVER 100 RUNS; VALUES ARE ALL IN SECONDS.
EXPERIMENTS RUN ON AN OTHERWISE IDLE SYSTEM WITH A DUAL-CORE
INTEL XEON CPU RUNNING AT 2.4 GHZ.
Topology kmax (No overlap) Minimum set cover
μ (σ) μ (σ)
HOT-1 0.001147 (0.000144) 0.023271 (0.002110)
HOT-2 0.004275 (0.000112) 0.159257 (0.007673)
HOT-3 0.011065 (0.000340) 0.634245 (0.007915)
HOT-4 0.356962 (0.009711) 120.318191 (1.654599)
HOT-5 1.530194 (0.041411) 1914.196850 (29.703459)
2) Localization: For the localization phase, we focus on the
time required to localize an observed performance anomaly,
and the number of paths probed during the localization phase.
As with the results for detection, we report the time re-
quired for localization in terms of the number of probing
intervals. Note that because we may probe more than one
(non-overlapping) path during a given localization interval
(as described in §V-C), the number of paths probed during
the localization phase may be greater than the time required
for localization. Finally, we note that in all experiments, the
localization algorithm succeeded to the extent possible given
measurement node placement and the topology.
Table V shows results for localizing an anomaly that was
observed during the detection phase. First, we observe that
the time required for localization is somewhat higher for
the detection phase case of kmax than for the choice of a
minimum set cover during detection. The basic reason is that
for the minimum set cover, more paths are probed during
each probing interval, thus there is greater opportunity for
narrowing the set of hypothesized anomalous path segments
immediately after an anomaly has been detected, but prior
to probing during localization. From this result, we observe
some beneﬁt to over-probing links during detection with a
minimum set cover. However, we also see that localization
times are still rather small when using kmax during the
detection phase. Furthermore, the probing and computational
costs of a minimum set cover may simply not be acceptable.
TABLE V
LOCALIZATION PHASE RESULTS FOR ALL TOPOLOGIES FOR THE kmax
AND MINIMUM SET COVER PATH SELECTION ALGORITHMS.
Localization Paths Localization Paths
Time Probed Time Probed
μ (σ) μ (σ) μ (σ) μ (σ)
kmax (No overlap) Minimum set cover
HOT-1 2.340 (0.690) 3.340 (0.690) 1.710 (0.675) 2.420 (0.955)
HOT-2 2.320 (0.700) 3.410 (0.826) 1.680 (0.714) 2.300 (1.005)
HOT-3 3.040 (1.045) 5.050 (1.470) 2.140 (0.817) 3.320 (1.158)
HOT-4 3.420 (1.079) 5.820 (1.522) 2.560 (1.896) 3.850 (1.998)
HOT-5 3.370 (1.182) 5.730 (1.667) 3.180 (1.092) 5.360 (1.544)
AS1299 3.040 (0.959) 4.230 (1.109) 1.750 (0.758) 2.230 (1.094)
AS3300 3.470 (1.010) 5.280 (1.369) 2.620 (1.074) 3.580 (1.394)
AS4323 3.290 (1.009) 5.070 (1.370) 1.770 (0.842) 1.950 (1.080)
AS1239 3.420 (1.018) 4.990 (1.320) 1.820 (0.878) 2.440 (1.213)
AS209 3.190 (0.958) 5.020 (1.330) 2.000 (0.882) 2.650 (1.187)
AS3549 2.570 (0.733) 3.540 (0.735) 1.250 (0.791) 1.240 (0.788)
AS3356 2.500 (0.736) 3.600 (0.851) 1.040 (0.493) 1.080 (0.697)
AS2914 3.310 (0.958) 5.170 (1.304) 1.890 (0.882) 2.360 (1.188)
AS701 2.880 (0.691) 4.530 (0.907) 1.280 (0.703) 1.360 (0.933)
AS7018 2.560 (0.810) 4.070 (1.128) 1.980 (0.787) 3.000 (1.138)
Finally, we compare the path selection algorithm for local-
ization described in § V-B with two other approaches. In the
ﬁrst approach, we choose a path that has the highest number of
overlapping links on a path segment in the set of hypothesized
anomalous links (“longest match”). In the second approach, we
choose a path that has the smallest number of overlapping links
on a path segment in the set of hypothesized anomalous links
(but with at least one overlapping link) (“shortest match”).
Figure 4 compares the mean number of paths required to
localize an anomaly for these three approaches (half overlap,
longest overlap, and shortest overlap) for 7 representative
topologies. In general, we observe that the mean and variability
of the number of paths required for anomaly localization
increase for the shortest and longest match path selection
variants, though the results are somewhat topology dependent.
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Fig. 4. Representative results comparing path selection policies during
localization. Bars indicate mean number of paths required for localization.
Lines indicate one standard deviation above and below the mean.9
Considering overall performance for both detection and
localization phases, note that for kmax, link load will always
be 1. For the minimum set cover, link load during detection
is generally somewhat greater than one (see Table III and
Figure 3). On the other hand, detection and localization times
are increased with the kmax approach compared with a mini-
mum set cover approach. While further experiments in a more
realistic environment will certainly shed light on what might
be expected in a live deployment, our contention is that the
probing and computational overheads of a minimum set cover
approach may not be acceptable in an operational environment,
making the tradeoff enabled by the kmax approach appealing.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present a framework for identifying and
localizing network performance anomalies. In contrast to prior
work on network-wide anomaly detection, our framework is
based on using active probes to measure behavior on origin-
destination paths and simpliﬁes the problem of raising alarms
by using SLA performance guarantees as thresholds. We
describe an algorithm for selecting the paths over which probes
will be sent that is designed to ensure that all links in a network
are probed in a fair and parsimonious fashion. We also describe
a localization algorithm that identiﬁes the link that is causing
the anomaly to be identiﬁed efﬁciently and quickly. Using a set
of simulations, we show that our set of algorithms is effective
at detecting and localizing performance anomalies.
In this work we assume a centralized control point has up-
to-date topological information, and can use that information
to make decisions about which paths to probe. A centralized
architecture also simpliﬁes any issues relating to how and
when probing is initiated at a given time interval, and how link
weights are maintained and updated. In the future we intend to
extend this work to consider a distributed architecture. We also
intend to extend our work to consider more complex anomaly
scenarios, such as multiple anomalies taking place, and non-
persistent anomalies. In the case of multiple anomalies, it may
be that we simply need to make simple modiﬁcations to our
localization algorithm in order for it to be run in parallel for
each observed anomaly. However, we plan to investigate this
issue further. Additionally, we intend to broaden our work
to include different kinds of performance anomalies, and to
perform experiments in a more realistic yet controlled environ-
ment such as a laboratory testbed. Finally, in our experiments
we have assumed that routes do not change. If a route changes
during the detection phase for a path between monitor stations
u and v and we detect a performance anomaly between those
two measurement hosts, we can set the hypothesized set of
problematic links to include the path segments both before
and after the routing change. The localization phase can then
proceed as normal. If no anomaly occurred between stations u
and v but the route changed, we can update the weights only
on links that were part of the route both before and after the
change (i.e., set their current weights to zero). Thus, we will
be likely to choose the parts of the path that changed in a near
iteration of the detection phase. We leave further examination
of this issue for future work.
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